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damage his competitive position in the market-if, as the dissent claimed, his
monopolistic position came from the superiority of the device. But that part
of the patentee's advantageous market position which is traceable to the cove-
nant has been removed and competition restored.
DISQUALIFICATION OF FEDERAL JUDGES FOR
PERSONAL BIAS
Following an appearance before the House Committee on Un-American Ac-
tivities, Lester Cole, a motion picture script writer, was suspended by his em-
ployer, Loew's, Incorporated, on the ground that his conduct before the com-
mittee had violated his contract of employment. He brought a suit to restrain
the suspension and to obtain damages. Invoking the disqualification provisions
of Section 21 of the Federal Judicial Code,' the defendants filed an application to
transfer the cause supported by an affidavit that the district judge assigned to
the case, Leon R. Yankwich, had a personal bias against them and in favor of
the plaintiff. The affidavit stated that during a discussion at the home of friends
about the hearings before the House committee Judge Yankwich had said "in
substance and effect that in his opinion there was no legal justification for the
suspension or discharge of any of the persons whose conduct before the com-
mittee resulted in their indictment; that he hoped that none of the cases arising
out of such suspensions or discharges came before him, but if they did, he would
have no alternative but to render judgment for the plaintiffs in such actions
and that if he were the attorney for such plaintiffs he could recover judgment
in their favor for millions of dollars., ,2 The names of persons present, the place,
the occasion, and approximate date of the remarks were included. Treating the
affidavit as true, Judge Yankwich found the facts stated insufficient to show the
personal bias he considered necessary to disqualify him under Section 21. The
section provides: "Whenever a party to any action or proceeding, civil or crim-
inal, shall make and file an affidavit that the judge before whom the action or
proceeding is to be tried or heard has a personal bias or prejudice against him
or in favor of any opposite party to the suit, such judge shall proceed no further
therein.... Every such affidavit shall state the facts and reasons for the be-
lief that such bias or prejudice exists."3 The application for transfer was de-
nied. Cole v. Loew's, 1Tc.4
314 U.S. 495 (i942). There is some dispute as to what the character of the change and the
length of time have to be. In the Ellis case the court stated that both the method of restraint
of competition must be abandoned and the consequences of the practices fully dissipated. In
general, see Bateman, op. cit. supra note 12, at 6i.
z 36 Stat. logo (1911), 28 U.S.C.A. § 25 (1927).
2 Cole v. Loew's, Inc., 76 F. Supp. 872, 875 (Cal., 1948).
3.36 Stat. 1oo (1911), 28 U.S.C.A. § 25 (i927). 4 76 F. Supp. 872 (Cal., 1948).
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While "for the record" Judge Yankwich denied the accuracy of the affidavit,s
he could pass only upon its "legal sufficiency" and not upon its truth or falsity,
according to the well-established rule first announced by the Supreme Court in
Berger v. United States.6 The holding of insufficiency in the present case was
based on failure to meet the requirement that the bias or prejudice be personal
-- "not the possession of definite views of the law or even a 'prejudgment' of
the controversy, but a personal attitude of enmity directed against the suitor."
Judge Yankwich classified the statements set out in the affidavit as merely pre-
conceived ideas of the law which might have been written in a legal text, and
hence as insufficient to support the allegation of personal bias.
Strict construction of Section 21 is supported by prior cases,7 some of them
involving prejudgment which, although more patent than that in the present
case, were still held not to disqualify.' Supreme Court precedent is lacking on
the question of whether an expression of opinion on the merits of a case should
disqualify. Berger v. United States, the Supreme Court's only determination of
the sufficiency of an affidavit under the section, set up this test: "The reasons
and facts must give fair support to the charge of a bent of mind that may pre-
vent or impede impartial judgment."9 This was an espionage case involving
several German-Americans. Although the necessity that the bias be of a per-
sonal nature was not stressed, the facts in the Berger case seem strong enough to
fulfill a requirement of personal enmity."° Only four subsequent appellate deci-
sions have been found holding affidavits sufficient,"" all of them relying chiefly
on the Berger case.
s Ibid., at 878. 6 255 U.S. 22 (1920).
7Skirvin v. Mesta, 141 F. 2d 668 (C.C.A. roth, I944); Scott v. Beams, 122 F. 2d 777 (C.C.A.
ioth, 1941).
8 In re Lisman, 89 F. 2d 898 (C.C.A. 2d, 1937) (affidavit that judge had told a trustee in
bankruptcy that he would deny the pending petition of a group of bondholders and had also
turned over documentary evidence in the case to a group of creditors who opposed the petition
held insufficient, since statements were merely indiscreet expressions); Johnson v. United
States, 35 F. 2d 355 (D.C. Wash., 1929) (affidavit claiming the judge had said that none of the
claimants in war risk insurance actions would recover in a trial before him so long as the
claimant could raise his hand held insufficient; but affidavit was also untimely, uncertain, and
in bad faith); Henry v. Speer, 2o Fed. 869 (C.C.A. 5 th, r913) (judge's submittal to a news-
paper of an article prejudging a pending case held to show prejudgment merely of the merits
of the controversy, a situation against which Section 21 was not directed).
9 255 U.S. 22 (1920). Ex parte American Steel Barrel Co., 230 U.S. 35 (1913), the only other
Supreme Court case involving the section, expressly limited itself to a narrow holding denying
mandamus to requalify a judge after disqualification.
10 However, McReynolds, J., one of three dissenting justices, maintained that the affidavit
merely showed prejudice toward a class and not against any one defendant. Berger v. United
States, 255 U.S. 22, 42-43 (1920).
"In Schmidt v. United States, z5 F. 2d 394 (C.C.A. 6th, x94o), it was charged that the
judge had expressed a prejudicial opinion regarding the facts of the case and the guilt of the
defendant. In Morris v. United States, 26 F. 2d 444 (C.C.A. 8th, 1928), the affidavit claimed
that the judge had described the defendant as one of the worst bootleggers in the country. In
Nations v. United States, X4 F. 2d 507 (C.C.A. 8th, 1926), the affidavit stated that the judge
had said that the defendant was guilty of conspiracy to violate prohibition laws. Lewis v.United
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The reason given for strict interpretation in Cole v. Loew's, Inc. and earlier
decisions is fear of abuse of the statute. However, safeguards pointed out in the
Berger decisionz limit the danger to some extent. An untruthful affidavit would
put the maker in danger of prosecution for perjury and would subject the at-
torney to disbarment.13 The affidavit's value as a delaying action is limited by
by the requirement that it must be filed ten days before commencement of the
term unless good cause can be shown. Furthermore, only one transfer 6f judges
is permitted. The requirement that the affiant state his reasons for belief that
bias exists permits elimination of affidavits based on rumor or gossip. Still it is
true that, whether or not the judge is disqualified, some delay is obtained.
Moreover, even if an affidavit is held insufficient, a party may take exception
and have ground for appeal after losing on the merits.
But the argument as to possibilities of abuse was met by the Supreme Court's
conclusion in the Berger case that "Congress was aware of them and consid-
ered that there were countervailing benefits."4 The Loew's decision does not
discuss the legislative intent behind Section 21, but from debates in Congress' s
it is clear that the sponsors of the bill wanted it to provide disqualification which
should not be contingent on the judge's finding that the reasons given, if true,
established the presence of bias. The absence of any provision in the act for a
fact-finding machinery to determine whether the judge is actually prejudiced
and the lack of a requirement that prejudice be proved suggest the same pri-
mary intent to relieve the litigant of a judge in whom he has no confidence
rather than to provide a remedy only against bias, actual or reasonably inferred.
Such nearly automatic operation was not, however, assured in the wording
of the act. As a result, the courts have apparently felt that the requirement of
an affidavit alleging personal bias or prejudice, with reasons for such belief, is so
clear that they can focus on the plain meaning of the words" and need not in-
vestigate an intent expressed only orally in Congress. Since the act does not de-
fine or give examples of personal bias or prejudice, the construction by the
courts, although admittedly strict, is difficult to attack. Some meaning must be
given to the word "personal."
The idea of allowing litigants the power of automatic rejection of the judge
States, 14 F. 2d 369 (C.C.A. 8th, 1926), did not report the statements of the affidavit but mere-
ly held that if the affidavit is in proper form the judge is to proceed no farther.
"2Berger v. United States, 255 U.S. 22, 34-35 (1920).
,a The effectiveness of these restraints where a judge has been merely "misquoted" may be
open to question.
,4Berger v. United States, 255 U.S. 22, 35 (i92o).
's 46 Cong. Record 3o6, 307, 2626-3o esp. 2629 (igi). In the discussion prejudice was
referred to as "taking sides," which would conceivably include prejudgment of the merits.
26 Craven v. United States, 22 F. 2d 6o5, 607 (C.C.A. ist, 1927), cert. den. 276 U.S. 627
(1927), states that the word "personal" characterizes the prejudgment guarded against and is
"the significant word" of the statute.
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scheduled to preside has not been popular with the judiciary.' 7 Judge Yank-
wich manifested this sentiment in stating the seldom-expressed view that a
judge has an affirmative duty to stay in a case even though his impartiality has
been challenged by an insufficient affidavit. 8 He quoted United States v. Buck,'9
which vigorously declared that a judge is the representative of the sovereign,
not of the parties, and should not abandon his trust merely because one of the
parties is opposed to him. This position has some force. Since judges are an es-
tablished part of the mechanism for obtaining justice, litigants taking the bene-
fits of the system must also accept individual differences among judges. To in-
sure public respect for the judiciary, any federal judge should be presumed
capable of administering a fair trial in any case until his acts indicate other-
wise. If district judges were to step aside on insufficient affidavits, their rank
would be similar to that of paid referees or jurors, whom parties may pick and
choose. It was such "shopping for a judge" that Judge Yankwich wanted to
prevent.
But although Judge Yankwich's opinion implies that only personal enmity
could under any circumstances result in an unfair trial, it would seem that an
expression of opinion on the merits of a case by a judge could be strong enough
to entitle a litigant to some form of relief .20 First, it demonstrates a lack of open-
mindedness toward a cause, an adverse leaning without just grounds or before
complete knowledge of the facts. Although impersonal, such an opinion impairs
part of the fundamental right to a fair trial-the right to be tried by a judge who
is reasonably free from bias."1 Second, it impairs the appearance of a fair trial
and a litigant's confidence that justice will be done. Whitaker v. McLean states,
"The policy underlying Section 21 is that the courts of the United States 'shall
not only be impartial in the ontroversies submitted to them, but shall give as-
surance that they are impartial'; i.e., shall appear to be impartial."- But opin-
ions vary as to what expressions by a judge lead to a reasonable inference that
he is incapable of conducting a fair trial. Judge Yankwich, in the present case,
maintains that a judge should not have to "padlock his civic conscience and
deny himself the right of a free man to express his views on civic or govern-
mental matters in the privacy of a friend's home." A Supreme Court justice has
said, "While 'an over-speaking judge is no well-tuned cymbal,' neither is an
17Judge Yankwich pointed out that since the enactment of Section 21 in Io2, courts
have sought to protect federal trial judges against the one-sidedness of the procedure. He com-
pared it unfavorably with the California practice, which provides for counter-affidavits by the
judge and their submission to another judge.Cal. Code Civ. Proc. (Hillyer-Lake, i947) § 170.5.
is In Saunders v. Piggly Wiggly Corp., z F. 2d 582 (D.C. Tenn., 1924) the judge withdrew
from the case even though he found the affidavit insufficient.
19 i8 F. Supp. 827 (Mo., 1937).
20 See Leonard v. Wilcox, ioi Vt. 195, 219, 220, 142 Atl. 762, 772 (1928), where the judge
had said that no matter what evidence was presented in the second trial of the case, his decision
would be the same.
" Whitaker v. McLean, 1i8 F. 2d 596 (App. D.C., 1941).
"Ibid. (italics added). See King v. Sussex Justices, [1924] 1. K.B. 256, 259, stressing
that justice should "manifestly" be done.
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amorphous dummy unspotted by human emotions a becoming receptacle for
judicial power."23 On the other hand, one state court has warned that a judge
should never commit himself upon any question either of fact or of law which
is likely to come before him.24 Although most states do not enforce this
strict standard,2s some have limited judicial expression by disqualification
statutes providing for automatic change of venue.26 A more flexible view which
would still provide protection for litigants was taken in Mitchell v. United States:
"It is the duty of all courts to guard against an appearance of prejudice which
might generate in the minds of litigants a well-grounded belief that the presiding
judge is personally biased or prejudiced against their cause.' '27 This is similar to
the "fair support" test in the Berger case. Such a test of sufficiency, unlike that
applied by Judge Yankwich, would not preclude disqualification for prejudg-
ment of the merits of a case.
The problem under any disqualification procedure lies in determining when
the danger of a partisan trial outweighs the danger of obstructing the adminis-
tration of justice. It is submitted that a litigant deserves relief whenever he can
show a well-grounded belief of a lack of openmindedness by the judge, whether
based on expressions of personal or of impersonal sentiments. The wording of
Section 21 failed to provide such relief, according to the hardly assailable con-
struction adopted in Cole v. Loew's, Inc. and supporting decisions. Instead of
permitting the judge whose impartiality has been questioned to decide whether
his alleged acts have demonstrated bias, a more satisfactory result could be ob-
tained by submitting the question to a second district judge. Such a procedure
is not prohibited in the act and was described in Craven v. United States as "a
fitting and common practice."' 8 Under the prevailing view a litigant in the
federal courts has little hope of using the section unless he can show evidence of
personal animosity, regardless of how much unfriendliness the judge has shown
to his cause. The section thuis applies only to a comparatively rare situation and
is relatively ineffective in some cases where there is an appearance of partiality.
EFFECT OF TAFT-HARTLEY UNION REQUIREMENTS
ON STATE ANTI-INJUNCTION ACT
About ioo employees of the Smith Cabinet Mfg. Co., of Salem, Indiana,
went on strike to force the company to recognize Local 3o9, United Furniture
Workers of America (CIO), as their bargaining representative. Although aware
23 Justice McReynolds, dissenting, in Berger v. United States, 255 U.S. 22, 42 (1920).
24 See Crawford v. Ferguson, 5 Okla. Cr. 377, 387, I'5 Pac. 278, 282 (igiI).
2S Fishbaugh v. Fishbaugh, 15 Cal. 2d 445, 1o P. 2d 1084 (i94o); Bradbum Motors Co. v.
Moverman, 63 R. I. 67, 7 A. 2d 207 (x939); King v. Grace, 293 Mass. 244, 200 N.E. 346 (1936).
' Ariz. Code Ann. (1939) §§ 21-107; Colo. Stat. Ann. (Michie, i935) c. i7o § i; Ind. Stat.
Ann. (Burns, 1933) §§ 2-1401, 2-1404, 9-i3oi; Mich. Stat. Ann. (Henderson, 1936) c. 27.466;
Mont. Rev. Codes Ann. (Anderson & McFarland, i935) § 8868.
'7 126 F. 2d 550, 552 (C.C.A. ioth, 1942) (italics added).
28 22 F. 2d 6o5, 6o6 (C.C.A. 1st, 1927).
